MIDDLE EAST AS A GEOPOLITICAL THRESHOLD

Breaking the stalemate in the U.S.-Iran standoff no longer hinges on the belligerents’ wartime tactics and calculations. For two reasons. One is obvious. Owing to a multitude of asymmetries -primarily geography, which heavily favoured the defender, affordable application of new technologies, critical outside support and uninformed overconfidence, there was no victor. The other, less readily evident, reason is the changing context.

The second Iran war obviously has not been an event in isolation. For Israel and the U.S., it was about completing the unfinished business left from the culmination of events last year. Hamas’s unexpected assault on Israel in October 2023 had triggered an all-out offensive by Israel beginning with Gaza and expanding to Iran’s proxies across the region. The momentum eventually brought Iran and Israel into direct conflict and dragged the U.S. into the fray as the preeminent belligerent. 2023, in turn, had its own, wider, context. It was characterized by post-2011 doldrums across the region now comprising many weakened, broken or collapsed states left in the wake of the uprisings and the ensuing wars -a process which dovetailed with the increased volatility across the entire north-to-south central belt of Eurasia where Europe and Asia progressively blur into one another and where global power shifts are most acutely felt.

This perilous environment had initially caused Israel to keep its guard up. Yet it simultaneously saw the opening to maximize its gains while all potential objectors were already overwhelmed by their existential challenges. With Mr Netanyahu and his extremist partners at the helm most of the time, the result became an almost foregone conclusion. Military muscle acquired further prominence. With the terror of 7 October, the transformation of Israel’s strategy from defensive deterrence to offensive superiority of initiative became total.

This shift increased the risk of mirror imaging between Israel and Iran. These sworn enemies already operate on a common base. It consists of armed power and the platform of non-recognition. Iran’s regional strategy rests on exerting influence and pressure through its militant proxies, accompanied by aerial offensive capabilities, whereas Israel depends on its accumulated military power and nothing much else. Iran still maintains a shady nuclear program and Israel is long known to be an undeclared nuclear power. The stakes are high. Iran does not recognize Israel and has a declared state policy that it should not exist. In turn, Israel considers it legitimate to eliminate this existential challenge. Additionally, Israel now openly tells -and not only at government level- that there will be no Palestinian state. Since Iran already considers Israel and Palestine as mutually exclusive, their positions converge on the one-state solution for opposite reasons. Thus, Palestine becomes the delegated nexus of the mutual existential fight. No wonder that the Gaza war gradually pulled the two sides into direct confrontation.

In action, they have together succeeded in projecting their bilateral conflict onto the region and beyond. Yet, this achievement could not have been possible without the United States’ direct involvement in the two successive wars. This way, Israel aggrandized its posture (and the U.S. shrank its own) by having the U.S. physically on its side, thus lending a global import to its case, whereas Iran instrumentalized American military presence across the region to expand the war to the multi-state theatre. And crucially, it denied transit through the Strait of Hormuz, thus taking a big part of the global commodity transport hostage, which made Iran’s case also a global concern.

The problem is, neither Iran nor Israel has much else to convert their dubious achievement into solid gain. For one, Iran cannot convince anyone that it must have a decisive say over the entirety of the Strait in peacetime simply because it still has many drones and speedboats to dispatch. Moreover, the U.S. maritime blockade on Iran’s shipping has already effectively countered Iran’s stranglehold on the Strait by depriving it of its own lifeline. This was in fact the primary factor which brought the two parties back to the negotiating table in early summer. Likewise, the specter of Iranian bomb swarms descending on infrastructure can hardly be a basis for restoring normalcy with the Gulf states.

For Israel, the overall favourable outlook is also not as solid as it appears. A year ago, it already looked as if Israel had reached the approximate limits of what it could achieve militarily. Another Iran war later, even its earlier gains do not look very secure. The state of Iran’s nuclear program remains unchanged, and its missile capability is largely intact. Also, Iran’s loss of Syria has not been commensurately reassuring for Israel, and Iran’s proxies are gradually reasserting themselves in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. The U.S. is already signaling that it does not intend to resume the fight. The unveiling of the “economic D-Day” which threatens sanctions against Iran’s trading partners can be seen also as an indirect admission that the war itself has been exhausted.

Their limitations are even greater at the core. In Iran, domestic discontent, grown further by the destruction of the economic infrastructure, shortages caused by the blockade and rampant inflation, simmers beneath the surface. The regime faces the dilemma of opting for either war-like or peace-like atmosphere, because the former helps check dissent better, whereas the latter offers the sole way to improving living conditions, if gradually. This question is apparently confounding the ruling elite. The mixed messages signaled by the civilian leadership and the security apparatus testify to the confusion. The confusion itself is a symptom of a bigger problem. On the surface, the ascendance of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to the helm of power can be seen as a further consolidation of the hardliners under its more venturesome new generation of commanders. But the Islamic Republic had been established on the basis of a clear hierarchy, following Ayatollah Khomeini’s instructions. The authority of the guardianship of the jurists (Vilayet-e Faqih) is absolute over the rule of the state and the society. The Iranian Constitution has no leeway for any lower authority (this obviously includes the IRGC which was expressly created to safeguard the revolutionary order) to even partly assume these functions. Mojtaba Khamenei was selected as the new revolutionary leader in place of his deceased father by a majority vote in the Assembly of Experts after repeated rounds, all taking place under immense pressure from the IRGC and relentless U.S.-Israeli bombardment. He has not yet been seen or heard from, except for statements published in his name. It is hard to tell if he is even alive. Balancing this occult leadership with the watchful eyes of the Qom seminary where the guardianship derives from must be stressful. The appointment of Mohsen Rezaee, a former long-time commander of the IRGC and Secretary of the Expediency Council, but perhaps more pertinent for today, a confidant of Khomeini, as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council may well indicate an effort to placate those who see their role melting away. The IRGC’s rise also has an unintended consequence. The executive branch of government under President Pezeshkian does not automatically come under the writ of the IRGC commanders just because they practically wield some powers which institutionally belong to the Supreme Leader and to the tightly knit oversight bodies. The diverging views between the Presidency -or the Foreign Minister- and the security establishment should not be treated merely as disagreements between hardliners and pragmatists like before. This stress within the regime structure will likely increase as the popular disgruntlement grows.

Israel is in a bind too. Its long-range aviation capacity is obviously a valuable asset. Yet, its value has diminished significantly after it was repeatedly and comprehensively deployed and fell short of delivering the intended objectives. Beyond that, carving out permanent buffer zones in neighbouring countries will again generate more instability than tranquility. Also, destabilizing neighbours carries more risks than bringing relief. But on top of all, to think that Palestinians will -politically and to the extent possible, demographically- disappear is a dangerous delusion. Israel’s increasingly more extreme steps on the ground may eventually trigger a backlash which the IDF, though highly efficient, is unsuited to handle. Moreover, Palestinians’ struggle for survival is merging with the want for dignity and freedom across the region. Israel is creating a huge legitimacy problem for itself which cannot be undone by schemes which bypass the core issue.       

Meanwhile, the Arab West, which is mainly lined along the Mediterranean coastline, finds out that prioritizing domestic control at the expense of commensurate regional clout is no longer a viable option. Regionwide instability initiated by others has only compounded the insecurity fed by the simmering resentments at home. New Syria must be added to this picture. Its long war concluded with a restyled former jihadist taking the helm. Yet a more defining feature of this outcome has been the total elimination of a single-party Arab state in the post-2011 phase. In essence, it was the model, already in vegetative state, which expired. This is in itself a milestone, and its impact on the region may be profound. These conditions induce states to engage themselves more energetically in shaping the events. On the other hand, the Arab East, mainly clustered in the Gulf, which gradually diffused from the Arab West and aligned more closely with the constellation of Indo-Pacific powers, now finds that a west coast initiative, in the form of Israel’s agenda, can result in wreaking havoc on the calm and the very assets which have powered it and expanded its horizons. All Arab states are now seeking to build versatile and layered defense postures. Overreliance on American security both proved insufficient and increased their vulnerability. The idea now is to engage more states as stakeholders in their wellbeing by knitting political and economic ties with security schemes. This way, the resultant web of commitments would  become riskier for the potential adversary to disturb. In the atomized post-2011 environment, Arab states individually seek the cooperative interest of outside powers nearby or farther afield to bolster their standing in their own neighbourhood, and this endeavour often goes hand in hand with heightened competition among otherwise likeminded states.

The Middle East’s growing demand for broader and more diversified outsider involvement in turn sets in motion a dynamic which will reconfigure the region’s geopolitical status in relation to global power dispersion. All major powers -the U.S., China and Russia- will continue to be involved, yet the field now includes more middle powers. Economic ties and connectivity -including the application of new technologies- will remain the primary area of this intensified interaction.

The United States’ overall security role may downgrade from guarantor to major contributor. Europe’s engagement will likely remain tentative and compartmental unless it realizes that the vast southern neighbourhood is in fact part of its own geopolitical reality, hence cannot be kept at a safe distance from “Fortress Europe”. The weakening of the transatlantic bond is already inducing Europe’s major powers to take matters in the Middle East more directly into their hands. It remains to be seen if their individual attempts will make a difference.  

The current outlook suggests that the Asia-Pacific space will make greater inroads to the region. China will loom even larger. It will not necessarily be militarily. China’s global approach does not follow the U.S. template. It prioritizes deepening the economic dependency of its partners. These ties and China’s own economic lifelines together form the basis of its security engagements. This approach may not instantly be effective in ending others’ wars but can serve as a useful procedure in persuading parties to agree on the terms it can accept. The Hormuz stalemate is one such occasion. It may or may not break the deadlock, but having China weigh in behind closed doors now looks more potent than the U.S. hardware. Iran cannot disappoint its great source of income and major lifeline. And the Gulf states now have every incentive to marshal their significance with the interests of China, India and others. The way this crisis is resolved will be a harbinger for what to expect in the broader process of the Middle East’s realignment. Whatever its eventual outcome may be, this realignment will represent the first tectonic jolt in the Indo-Pacific/Euro-Atlantic stress.

For a growing middle power like Turkey, deeper engagement with the vast geography to its south obviously becomes an even more luring enterprise as the region cracks open further. And it should seize the opportunity. But how?  First, Turkey’s comparatively stronger assets are not in themselves the basis of policies. They instead demonstrate the level of its capabilities in setting realistic objectives. Second, Arabs’ narratives on mutual historical ties are often in conflict with Turkey’s. Evoking the past imperial unity is a definitive non-starter for all Arabs. Third, honoring historical inheritance is not about reliving it. It is about drawing the right lessons from its evolution to chart today and the future course. For this, the standard is set at home. Turkey emerged as a nation-state from its expired imperial past. And self-claimed power with divine attributes was irreversibly transferred to the people. There is no going back. So, Turkey recognized its new Arab neighbours and partners as sovereign equals. Fourth, two golden rules guided modern Turkey’s policies in the region: do not get involved in inter-Arab conflicts and do not interfere in their domestic affairs. They provided Turkey with the unique scope to interact with all parties in the region as a credible partner and trusted interlocutor. Even during the Cold War, Turkey could advance its relations by carefully delineating its different commitments. Trust enabled Turkey to expand and deepen its political, economic and social footprint almost exponentially. Turkey would act as a facilitator in the Israeli Palestinian dispute and between Israel and Syria, in helping settle the Presidential election deadlock in Lebanon, and in joining the UNIFIL as an assuring participant after the second Lebanon war, to cite a few. Some of these occurred in the earlier years of this government. How Turkey’s pioneering role in launching the “Neighbouring Countries Initiative” as war loomed large over Iraq in 2003 and in pursuing the process throughout contrasted with its involvement and entanglement in Syria less than a decade later is perhaps more illustrative of the policies past and present. In the former, the objective was to claim regional ownership in containing and managing the repercussions of the U.S. invasion and in guiding post-war Iraq peacefully back into the regional fold. These key objectives were achieved through diligent diplomacy with disputing partners. Eventually, the initiative was joined by the five permanent members of the UNSC, the EU, the Arab League, and the OIC, and became a global undertaking. In the latter, the government joined the fray. The rest is history. How it impacted on lives, Turkey’s security concerns, demographics, economy and relations with other countries has been in full view.

The government continued venturing into more theatres until it could not, owing to Turkey’s growing isolation. However, its tendency to employ elements of its impulsive and ideologically motivated conduct persists. The government portrays this as proactive policy. Its pliant supporters and apologists readily agree. They confuse deeper engagement with involvement in others’ disputes. Turkey does have an emerging role to play in enhancing  regional security. That role is stability generation. That requires assiduous work with all parties for broader confidence building. In certain instances, this work may well entail defensive support, nothing more. Turkey must not fall into the endless cycle of rival groupings. This will be consuming and futile. Viable balancing rests on fostering mutual interest with all. “Mehmetcik”, as we affectionately refer to our young men under arms, must never go in harm’s way unless we are faced with a direct aggression.

(August 28, 2026)